

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04227 01 OF 02 261831Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----069852 261836Z /42

O 261840Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8903
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 4227

EXDIS TREAT AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, UN, LE, IS
SUBJ: SOUTH LEBANON: MOVEMENT OF LEBANESE TROOPS

1. KINSOLVING AND I CALLED ON BOUTROS AT HIS REQUEST AT HOME AT 1730 LOCAL JULY 26. G-2 MAJOR ABDO WAS ALSO PRESENT. BOUTROS STARTED CONVERSATION BY SAYING DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO SEND TROOPS TO SOUTH SUNDAY OR MONDAY AT LATEST. GOL WAS PREPARED TO TAKE OBVIOUS RISKS INVOLVED BUT WANTED TO MINIMIZE THEM TO EXTENT POSSIBLE. IN PARTICULAR, THEY WANTED MINIMIZE ADVERSE REACTION FROM PEOPLE ON THE GROUND, I.E., CHRISTIAN MILITIA AND HADDAD-CHIDIAC FORCES. THEY WANTED TO PREPARE CAREFULLY, AND ABDO WOULD GIVE US DETAILS.

2. BOUTROS SAID IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT WE MAKE DEMARCHE TO ISRAELIS ASKING THEM TO PREVENT ADVERSE REACTION BY MILITIAS, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO RAPID DETERIORATION OF SITUATION AND WHICH WOULD IN TURN BE DANGEROUS TO ENTIRE AREA. THERE WERE MANY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04227 01 OF 02 261831Z

PARTIES IN LEBANON WHO MAINTAINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE RELUCTANT TO SEE OPPOSITION FROM MILITIAS TO ARMY'S MOVE. IF SUCH OPPOSITION DID OCCUR, IT WOULD BE USED AGAINST LEBANESE AS WELL AS AMERICANS. ENTRY OF TROOPS INTO SOUTH WAS IMPORTANT FOR UNITED NATIONS. GOL HAD DECIDED TO MOVE IN SPITE OF THE DIFFICULTIES. IT WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC IF THEY FAILED. IF THEY SUCCEED, THERE COULD BE PROGRESS ON OTHER

ISSUES. LEBANESE MUST MOBILIZE INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIPS TO HELP THEM. WE HAD URGED SARKIS TO REMAIN IN OFFICE. INPLICIT IN OUR URGINGS WAS A COMMITMENT TO HELP HIM. THE TIME HAD NOW COME TO DO SO.

3. MAJOR ABDO THEN GAVE FOLLOWING DETAILS OF OPERATION:

A. ROUTE - TROOPS WILL MOVE DOWN BEKAA VIA KFAR MISHKI AND KAWKABA. THEY WILL PASS BY BUT NOT ENTER MARJAYUN. RATHER, THEY WILL GO BETWEEN THAT TOWN AND AL-KHIAM AND THENCE TO TELL NHAS, KFAR KILA, ADAYSSE, AND TAYBEH TO TIBNINE. TROOPS WILL BE STATIONED IN TIBNINE-QA'QA'IYYAH REGION, WHICH WAS QUIETEST SECTOR.

B. COMPOSITION - TROOPS WILL BE COMPOSED OF ONE BATTALION OF ABOUT 500 MEN TAKEN FROM VANGUARDS OF BEKAA. THEY WILL BE 60 PERCENT MOSLEM, LARGELY SHI'A, AND 40 PERCENT CHRISTIAN, ABOUT HALF OF WHOM WILL BE MARONITES. TROOP COMMANDER WILL BE COL. ADIB SAAD, A MARONITE. MAJOR IBRAHIM SHAHIN, A SHI'A, WILL BE HIS DEPUTY. SAAD HAS BEEN PICKED AS COMMANDER TO REASSURE ISRAELIS THAT TROOPS WILL NOT BE PAWNS OF SYRIANS. LEBANESE ARE WELL AWARE OF ISRAELI SUSPICIONS OF VANGUARDS AND ARE DOING BEST TO MEET THEM. THAT IS REASON FORCE IS SO SMALL.

4. ABDO SAID LEBANESE FORESAW TWO AREAS OF DIFFICULTY ALONG
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04227 01 OF 02 261831Z

THEIR ROUTE. FIRST WAS STRETCH BETWEEN KFAR MISHKI AND KAWKABA, WHICH WAS CONTROLLED BY PALESTINIANS. SYRIANS HAD UNDERTAKEN TO TAKE CONTROL OF ROAD BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER AND TO PREVENT PALESTINIANS FROM INTERFERING WITH MOVEMENT. PALESTINIANS OPPOSED TO ENTRY WILL BE REMOVED. SYRIANS WILL ALSO UNDERTAKE TO KEEP ROAD OPEN AS LINE OF COMMUNICATION.

5. SECOND AREA WAS THAT BETWEEN NORWEGIAN BATTALION AND TAYBEH, WHICH ISRAELIS HAVE CONTROLLED THROUGH HADDAD. ABDO FEARS ISRAELIS MAY FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF MILITIAS FROM CHIDIAC'S ENCLAVE OVER TO MARJAYUN AND THIS COULD CAUSE TROUBLE. MAJOR HADDAD WOULD NOT BE DISPOSED TO TOLERATE MILITIA FROM OTHER AREAS IN HIS AREA, BUT LEBANESE PLANNED TO TRANSFER HADDAD AND ASK HIM TO TURN HIS TROOPS OVER TO HIS DEPUTY, RIZKALLAH FHAYLY. THEY WERE ALSO GOING TO ORDER CHIDIAN TO TURN OVER TO HIS DEPUTY, LT. GEORGE ZAATAR.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04227 02 OF 02 261836Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----069956 261839Z /42

O 261840Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8904
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4227

EXDIS TREAT AS NODIS

6. I ASKED WHAT WAS TO HAPPEN TO HADDAD AND CHIDIAC. THEY SAID THEY EXPECTED CHIDIAC WOULD DECIDE TO SETTLE IN ISRAEL. GOL ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIM WOULD DEPEND ON HIS REACTION TO ORDER TO TURN OVER COMMAND TO HIS DEPUTY. AS FOR HADDAD, HE WOULD GET SOME INFORMAL COMPENSATION FOR THE FUTURE. HE WOULD NOT BE SACRIFICED. THEY WERE PLANNING TO GIVE HIM A YEAR'S LEAVE OF ABSENCE, AFTER WHICH THEY WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE FOR HIM. HE WOULD BE ADEQUATELY SUPPLIED WITH FUNDS. THEY WERE SENDING AN OFFICER, A LT. HOMSI WHO WAS ORIGINALLY FROM QULAYA, TO SEE HADDAD AND EXPLAIN THEIR OFFER TO HIM. THEY UNDERSTOOD HADDAD WANTED TO GO TO THE UNITED STATES. HE MIGHT FEEL SAFER THERE. THERE WAS ALSO A POSSIBILITY OF A JOB IN AFRICA IF HE WAS INTERESTED.

7. I SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO REASON TO REFUSE A VISA TO HADDAD, BUT HE HAD BETTER NOT GO TO THE UNITED STATES IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY. THAT WOULD HAVE VERY UNFORTUNATE IMPLICATIONS IN THE EYES OF MANY PEOPLE, WHO WOULD CONSIDER THIS PROOF OF OUR SUPPORT FOR HADDAD. BOUTROS AND ABDO SAID THEY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04227 02 OF 02 261836Z

GOT THE POINT AND WOULD ENCOURAGE HIM TO GO ELSEWHERE. IN ANY EVENT, HE WOULD HAVE NO OFFICIAL CAPACITY. BOUTROS NOTED THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS WERE ALL CONTINGENT ON ISRAELIS BEING COOPERATIVE.

8. ABDO SAID THEY WOULD NOTIFY ISRAELIS FORTY-EIGHT HOURS IN ADVANCE OF D-DAY THAT THEY WANTED ILMAC MEETING, DURING WHICH THEY WOULD INFORM THEM OF THEIR PLANS. AT LAST ILMAC MEETING ISRAELIS HAD ASKED FOR 24 HOURS NOTICE BEFORE TROOPS WENT IN.

9. I ASKED WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH UNIFIL ABOUT DETAILS. THEY SAID THEY HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH GEN. CUQ AND THAT THEY WOULD BE SEEING AIME JULY 28.

10. I THEN REVERTED TO WHAT BOUTROS HAD SAID ABOUT OUR HELPING SARKIS. WE WERE ANXIOUS FOR LEBANESE TROOPS TO ENTER THE SOUTH AND WE WERE PREPARED TO HELP TO THE EXTENT WE COULD. WE COULD TRY TO IRON OUT MISUNDERSTANDINGS, BUT WE COULD NOT DO ALL THEIR NEGOTIATING FOR THEM. I WAS HAPPY TO HEAR THEY WERE CALLING FOR AN ILMAC MEETING BECAUSE IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY DISCUSS THESE DETAILS WITH THE ISRAELIS.

11. BOUTROS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL THAT WE COULD NOT DO THEIR NEGOTIATING FOR THEM; BUT HE WANTED US TO USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE ISRAELIS TO CONVINCE THEM THEY MUST BE COOPERATIVE. WE WERE PROBABLY THE ONLY COUNTRY ABLE TO DO SO, BUT HE WOULD ALSO MAKE DEMARCHES TO THE FRENCH AND BRITISH AMBASSADORS THE NEXT DAY. HE HAD ALSO TRIED TO CALL IN THE SOVIET BUT HE HAD REFUSED TO COME TO ASHRAFIYAH FOR SECURITY REASONS.

12. I ASKED EXACTLY WHAT THEY WANTED US TO TELL THE ISRAELIS. BOUTROS AND ABDO SAID WE COULD GIVE THEM ALL THE DETAILS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04227 02 OF 02 261836Z

REGARDING THE ROUTE AND COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES. THEY DID NOT WANT US TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS THE DETAILS OF THEIR PLANS FOR HADDAD, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THAT WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE LEAKED BY THEM TO THEIR CONTACTS IN BEIRUT. WE COULD TELL THE ISRAELIS THAT HADDAD WOULD NOT BE SACRIFICED AND WOULD BE TAKEN CARE OF, AND THAT CHIDIAC'S FUTURE WOULD DEPEND ON HIS REACTION. (I ASSUME THEY MEAN THAT IF HE ELECTS TO SETTLE IN ISRAEL, THE LEBANESE WILL FEEL NO FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIM, BUT THAT IF HE IS COOPERATIVE ABOUT TURNING OVER HIS COMMAND, SOMETHING COULD BE ARRANGED FOR HIM, TOO.)

13. COMMENT: WE HAVE URGED THE LEBANESE TO BITE THE BULLET AND THEY HAVE DECIDED TO DO SO. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE NOW GIVE THEM ALL THE SUPPORT WE CAN, BOTH FOR INTERNAL LEBANESE REASONS AND BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT ON UNIFIL. I AM SURE THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED WILL FALL SHORT OF WHAT THE ISREALIS WANT, BUT EVERYBODY IS GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE SOME COMPROMISES. PARKER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMED FORCES, TROOP DEPLOYMENT, DEMARCHE, MILITARY PERSONNEL, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MILITARY PLANS, PERSONNEL SEPARATIONS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BEIRUT04227
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P850083-2476
Format: TEL
From: BEIRUT
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780720/aaaaaqpq.tel
Line Count: 223
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 7ffe66c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, EXDIS
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1887454
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SOUTH LEBANON: MOVEMENT OF LEBANESE TROOPS
TAGS: PORG, MPOL, US, LE, IS, (BOUTROS, FOUAD), (PARKER, RICHARD B)
To: STATE SS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbcc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7ffe66c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014